shell bypass 403
UnknownSec Shell
:
/
usr
/
src
/
linux-headers-6.8.0-83
/
arch
/
powerpc
/
crypto
/ [
drwxr-xr-x
]
upload
mass deface
mass delete
console
info server
name :
ghashp10-ppc.pl
#!/usr/bin/env perl # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # This code is taken from the OpenSSL project but the author (Andy Polyakov) # has relicensed it under the GPLv2. Therefore this program is free software; # you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General # Public License version 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. # # The original headers, including the original license headers, are # included below for completeness. # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further # details see https://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. # ==================================================================== # # GHASH for PowerISA v2.07. # # July 2014 # # Accurate performance measurements are problematic, because it's # always virtualized setup with possibly throttled processor. # Relative comparison is therefore more informative. This initial # version is ~2.1x slower than hardware-assisted AES-128-CTR, ~12x # faster than "4-bit" integer-only compiler-generated 64-bit code. # "Initial version" means that there is room for futher improvement. $flavour=shift; $output =shift; if ($flavour =~ /64/) { $SIZE_T=8; $LRSAVE=2*$SIZE_T; $STU="stdu"; $POP="ld"; $PUSH="std"; } elsif ($flavour =~ /32/) { $SIZE_T=4; $LRSAVE=$SIZE_T; $STU="stwu"; $POP="lwz"; $PUSH="stw"; } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; } $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1; ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or die "can't locate ppc-xlate.pl"; open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output" || die "can't call $xlate: $!"; my ($Xip,$Htbl,$inp,$len)=map("r$_",(3..6)); # argument block my ($Xl,$Xm,$Xh,$IN)=map("v$_",(0..3)); my ($zero,$t0,$t1,$t2,$xC2,$H,$Hh,$Hl,$lemask)=map("v$_",(4..12)); my ($Xl1,$Xm1,$Xh1,$IN1,$H2,$H2h,$H2l)=map("v$_",(13..19)); my $vrsave="r12"; my ($t4,$t5,$t6) = ($Hl,$H,$Hh); $code=<<___; .machine "any" .text .globl .gcm_init_p10 lis r0,0xfff0 li r8,0x10 mfspr $vrsave,256 li r9,0x20 mtspr 256,r0 li r10,0x30 lvx_u $H,0,r4 # load H le?xor r7,r7,r7 le?addi r7,r7,0x8 # need a vperm start with 08 le?lvsr 5,0,r7 le?vspltisb 6,0x0f le?vxor 5,5,6 # set a b-endian mask le?vperm $H,$H,$H,5 vspltisb $xC2,-16 # 0xf0 vspltisb $t0,1 # one vaddubm $xC2,$xC2,$xC2 # 0xe0 vxor $zero,$zero,$zero vor $xC2,$xC2,$t0 # 0xe1 vsldoi $xC2,$xC2,$zero,15 # 0xe1... vsldoi $t1,$zero,$t0,1 # ...1 vaddubm $xC2,$xC2,$xC2 # 0xc2... vspltisb $t2,7 vor $xC2,$xC2,$t1 # 0xc2....01 vspltb $t1,$H,0 # most significant byte vsl $H,$H,$t0 # H<<=1 vsrab $t1,$t1,$t2 # broadcast carry bit vand $t1,$t1,$xC2 vxor $H,$H,$t1 # twisted H vsldoi $H,$H,$H,8 # twist even more ... vsldoi $xC2,$zero,$xC2,8 # 0xc2.0 vsldoi $Hl,$zero,$H,8 # ... and split vsldoi $Hh,$H,$zero,8 stvx_u $xC2,0,r3 # save pre-computed table stvx_u $Hl,r8,r3 stvx_u $H, r9,r3 stvx_u $Hh,r10,r3 mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .gcm_init_p10,.-.gcm_init_p10 .globl .gcm_init_htable lis r0,0xfff0 li r8,0x10 mfspr $vrsave,256 li r9,0x20 mtspr 256,r0 li r10,0x30 lvx_u $H,0,r4 # load H vspltisb $xC2,-16 # 0xf0 vspltisb $t0,1 # one vaddubm $xC2,$xC2,$xC2 # 0xe0 vxor $zero,$zero,$zero vor $xC2,$xC2,$t0 # 0xe1 vsldoi $xC2,$xC2,$zero,15 # 0xe1... vsldoi $t1,$zero,$t0,1 # ...1 vaddubm $xC2,$xC2,$xC2 # 0xc2... vspltisb $t2,7 vor $xC2,$xC2,$t1 # 0xc2....01 vspltb $t1,$H,0 # most significant byte vsl $H,$H,$t0 # H<<=1 vsrab $t1,$t1,$t2 # broadcast carry bit vand $t1,$t1,$xC2 vxor $IN,$H,$t1 # twisted H vsldoi $H,$IN,$IN,8 # twist even more ... vsldoi $xC2,$zero,$xC2,8 # 0xc2.0 vsldoi $Hl,$zero,$H,8 # ... and split vsldoi $Hh,$H,$zero,8 stvx_u $xC2,0,r3 # save pre-computed table stvx_u $Hl,r8,r3 li r8,0x40 stvx_u $H, r9,r3 li r9,0x50 stvx_u $Hh,r10,r3 li r10,0x60 vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·H.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·H.lo+H.lo·H.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·H.hi vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $IN1,$Xl,$t1 vsldoi $H2,$IN1,$IN1,8 vsldoi $H2l,$zero,$H2,8 vsldoi $H2h,$H2,$zero,8 stvx_u $H2l,r8,r3 # save H^2 li r8,0x70 stvx_u $H2,r9,r3 li r9,0x80 stvx_u $H2h,r10,r3 li r10,0x90 vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$H2l # H.lo·H^2.lo vpmsumd $Xl1,$IN1,$H2l # H^2.lo·H^2.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H2 # H.hi·H^2.lo+H.lo·H^2.hi vpmsumd $Xm1,$IN1,$H2 # H^2.hi·H^2.lo+H^2.lo·H^2.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$H2h # H.hi·H^2.hi vpmsumd $Xh1,$IN1,$H2h # H^2.hi·H^2.hi vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vpmsumd $t6,$Xl1,$xC2 # 1st reduction phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vsldoi $t4,$Xm1,$zero,8 vsldoi $t5,$zero,$Xm1,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vxor $Xl1,$Xl1,$t4 vxor $Xh1,$Xh1,$t5 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vsldoi $Xl1,$Xl1,$Xl1,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vxor $Xl1,$Xl1,$t6 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd reduction phase vsldoi $t5,$Xl1,$Xl1,8 # 2nd reduction phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vpmsumd $Xl1,$Xl1,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $t5,$t5,$Xh1 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t1 vxor $Xl1,$Xl1,$t5 vsldoi $H,$Xl,$Xl,8 vsldoi $H2,$Xl1,$Xl1,8 vsldoi $Hl,$zero,$H,8 vsldoi $Hh,$H,$zero,8 vsldoi $H2l,$zero,$H2,8 vsldoi $H2h,$H2,$zero,8 stvx_u $Hl,r8,r3 # save H^3 li r8,0xa0 stvx_u $H,r9,r3 li r9,0xb0 stvx_u $Hh,r10,r3 li r10,0xc0 stvx_u $H2l,r8,r3 # save H^4 stvx_u $H2,r9,r3 stvx_u $H2h,r10,r3 mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .gcm_init_htable,.-.gcm_init_htable .globl .gcm_gmult_p10 lis r0,0xfff8 li r8,0x10 mfspr $vrsave,256 li r9,0x20 mtspr 256,r0 li r10,0x30 lvx_u $IN,0,$Xip # load Xi lvx_u $Hl,r8,$Htbl # load pre-computed table le?lvsl $lemask,r0,r0 lvx_u $H, r9,$Htbl le?vspltisb $t0,0x07 lvx_u $Hh,r10,$Htbl le?vxor $lemask,$lemask,$t0 lvx_u $xC2,0,$Htbl le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask vxor $zero,$zero,$zero vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t1 le?vperm $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask stvx_u $Xl,0,$Xip # write out Xi mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0 .long 0 .size .gcm_gmult_p10,.-.gcm_gmult_p10 .globl .gcm_ghash_p10 lis r0,0xfff8 li r8,0x10 mfspr $vrsave,256 li r9,0x20 mtspr 256,r0 li r10,0x30 lvx_u $Xl,0,$Xip # load Xi lvx_u $Hl,r8,$Htbl # load pre-computed table le?lvsl $lemask,r0,r0 lvx_u $H, r9,$Htbl le?vspltisb $t0,0x07 lvx_u $Hh,r10,$Htbl le?vxor $lemask,$lemask,$t0 lvx_u $xC2,0,$Htbl le?vperm $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask vxor $zero,$zero,$zero lvx_u $IN,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 subi $len,$len,16 le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask vxor $IN,$IN,$Xl b Loop .align 5 Loop: subic $len,$len,16 vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0 vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi and r0,r0,$len vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi add $inp,$inp,r0 vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st phase vsldoi $t0,$Xm,$zero,8 vsldoi $t1,$zero,$Xm,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t0 vxor $Xh,$Xh,$t1 vsldoi $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,8 vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t2 lvx_u $IN,0,$inp addi $inp,$inp,16 vsldoi $t1,$Xl,$Xl,8 # 2nd phase vpmsumd $Xl,$Xl,$xC2 le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask vxor $t1,$t1,$Xh vxor $IN,$IN,$t1 vxor $IN,$IN,$Xl beq Loop # did $len-=16 borrow? vxor $Xl,$Xl,$t1 le?vperm $Xl,$Xl,$Xl,$lemask stvx_u $Xl,0,$Xip # write out Xi mtspr 256,$vrsave blr .long 0 .byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0 .long 0 .size .gcm_ghash_p10,.-.gcm_ghash_p10 .asciz "GHASH for PowerISA 2.07, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>" .align 2 ___ foreach (split("\n",$code)) { if ($flavour =~ /le$/o) { # little-endian s/le\?//o or s/be\?/#be#/o; } else { s/le\?/#le#/o or s/be\?//o; } print $_,"\n"; } close STDOUT; # enforce flush
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