name : randomize_kstack.h /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H #define _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/percpu-defs.h> DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, randomize_kstack_offset); DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset); /* * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst * * The normal __builtin_alloca() is initialized with INIT_STACK_ALL (currently * only with Clang and not GCC). Initializing the unused area on each syscall * entry is expensive, and generating an implicit call to memset() may also be * problematic (such as in noinstr functions). Therefore, if the compiler * supports it (which it should if it initializes allocas), always use the * "uninitialized" variant of the builtin. */ #if __has_builtin(__builtin_alloca_uninitialized) #define __kstack_alloca __builtin_alloca_uninitialized #else #define __kstack_alloca __builtin_alloca #endif /* * Use, at most, 10 bits of entropy. We explicitly cap this to keep the * "VLA" from being unbounded (see above). 10 bits leaves enough room for * per-arch offset masks to reduce entropy (by removing higher bits, since * high entropy may overly constrain usable stack space), and for * compiler/arch-specific stack alignment to remove the lower bits. */ #define KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(x) ((x) & 0x3FF) /** * add_random_kstack_offset - Increase stack utilization by previously * chosen random offset * * This should be used in the syscall entry path when interrupts and * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to * the stack. For testing the resulting entropy, please see: * tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/stack-entropy.sh */ #define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ u8 *ptr = __kstack_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset)); \ /* Keep allocation even after "ptr" loses scope. */ \ asm volatile("" :: "r"(ptr) : "memory"); \ } \ } while (0) /** * choose_random_kstack_offset - Choose the random offset for the next * add_random_kstack_offset() * * This should only be used during syscall exit when interrupts and * preempt are disabled. This position in the syscall flow is done to * frustrate attacks from userspace attempting to learn the next offset: * - Maximize the timing uncertainty visible from userspace: if the * offset is chosen at syscall entry, userspace has much more control * over the timing between choosing offsets. "How long will we be in * kernel mode?" tends to be more difficult to predict than "how long * will we be in user mode?" * - Reduce the lifetime of the new offset sitting in memory during * kernel mode execution. Exposure of "thread-local" memory content * (e.g. current, percpu, etc) tends to be easier than arbitrary * location memory exposure. */ #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { \ if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ offset ^= (rand); \ raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \ } \ } while (0) #else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */ #define add_random_kstack_offset() do { } while (0) #define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { } while (0) #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */ #endif